The Supreme Court returns for arguments on Nov. 30, 2026, for what will be a significant month for the Court. First up for the justices will be an important case about immigration asylum and green card eligibility.
On the sitting’s first day, the justices will consider Wassily v. Blanche, where both parties in the case are asking the Court to rule on a federal law that might disqualify non-citizens legally granted asylum from lawful permanent resident (LPR) or green card status if their asylum has been terminated after arriving in the United States.
Federal appeals courts have divided over this question. The petition to the Court comes from Tamer S. Wassily and Byron E. Velasquez Arreaga, who were found ineligible to pursue green cards by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit after losing asylum status.
The specific question at the Supreme Court is “[w]hether noncitizens who were ‘granted asylum,’ but whose asylum was later terminated, are eligible for adjustment to LPR status under Section 1159(b) (as the Fifth Circuit held), or are categorically ineligible (as the Second and Fourth Circuits held)?”
The case’s path to the Supreme Court
Much of the case turns on differing interpretations of Section 1159(b) of Title 8 of the United States Code, which states that the secretary of homeland security or the attorney general “may adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien granted asylum” under certain conditions. The law also allows the secretary or attorney general to waive provisions for “humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.”
In 2000, Wassily was granted asylum due to persecution in Egypt for his religious beliefs. In 2004, he was convicted of third-degree stalking and child endangerment, and the federal government began removal proceedings. An immigration judge terminated Wassily’s asylum status but held that Wassily could ask to adjust to LPR or green card status because of the threat of religious persecution and other humanitarian considerations.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the judge’s decision and determined that under the federal statute Wassily was ineligible to adjust to LPR status because his asylum had been terminated before his LPR adjustment application was considered.
Byron Velasquez Arreaga was granted asylum from Guatemala in 1996. In 2015 and 2018, he was convicted of driving while intoxicated, and the federal government began removal proceedings. An immigration judge terminated Velasquez Arreaga’s asylum status and determined that Velasquez Arreaga was ineligible to adjust to LPR or green card status because his asylum had been terminated. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the decision.
The Second Circuit considered the cases in tandem. A divided court denied the petitions and said that once asylum has been terminated, adjustment to apply for green card status under Section 1159(b) was unavailable. The majority cited various interpretations of the language of Section 1159(b). The majority also stated that a post-enactment “statutory note” to the Immigration Act of 1990 made Section 1159(b) inapplicable.
And the majority noted its decision split from Siwa v. Holder (2024), where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a noncitizen “whose asylum has been terminated is not prohibited from applying for adjustment of status” under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). The Second Circuit majority disagreed with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning.
In her dissent, Second Circuit Judge Beth Robinson noted, “The text of the statute supports the conclusion that a noncitizen granted asylum is not categorically ineligible to seek adjustment of status under § 1159(b) following termination of the asylum.” The judge cited the inclusion by Congress of waiver language as supporting her conclusion.
The case was considered once at private conference by the justices in June 2026 and summarily granted.
The arguments at the Court
In their most recent briefs at the Court, the federal government and the attorneys for Wassily and Velasquez Arreaga frame the case as a matter of statutory interpretation.
Solicitor General D. John Sauer argues that the Second Circuit decision correctly reads the law as intended by Congress. “When Congress bestows a benefit on an ‘alien granted asylum,’ the common-sense understanding is that the benefit inures to an alien with asylum status, not to any alien who once had that status but was later deprived of it,” he argues.
Sauer believes the petitioners are depending on a narrow reading of the statute to make their case. “Petitioners’ asserted support boils down to Congress’s use of a past participle that can sometimes function as a verb, what petitioners view as clearer requirements of other continuing conditions else-where, and a series of unwarranted inferences drawn from other statutory provisions, statutory history, and supposed congressional purpose.”
Sauer also rejects a claim from Wassily and Velasquez Arreaga that the “rule of lenity” applies in their case. The rule allows for a court when considering a law that is ambiguous or vague to decide in favor of the defendant.
The petitioners in their most-recent brief note that “Congress did not intend to foreclose adjustment to LPR status for every noncitizen whose asylum status could be terminated.” They cite that the attorney general, under the law, can grant LPR status to refugees with criminal convictions. But nothing in the law as written by Congress cuts “off that discretion at the moment of termination” of asylum status, they argue.
The petitioners also believe the solicitor general incorrectly argues that Section 1159(b) implies that disqualified asylum status leads to an inability to seek a green card.
“When Congress wanted adjustment to turn on a continuing condition, it said so explicitly, three times in Section 1159, in those words, and in enumerated paragraphs. The government never explains why a Congress so careful about listing present conditions in Section 1159 would impose this one condition by implication,” it says.
Given the clear circuit split in the case and how quickly the Court granted arguments, the justices should play an active role during arguments in directly questioning both sides on their various interpretations of the grammar and phrasing of Section 1159(b).
A decision from the Court will likely come as it concludes in merits docket cases in late June 2027.
Among the other disputes to be heard until Dec. 9.2026, are arguments over the Second Amendment and automatic rifles; the First Amendment and the religious right to assemble; the National Voter Registration Act; parental rights and gender transition; and Title IX and sex discrimination.
Scott Bomboy is the editor in chief of the National Constitution Center.