Reynolds v. Sims (1964)

Summary

At the time of Reynolds v. Sims, dozens of states had not redistricted their state legislative districts for several decades, despite dramatic shifts in population. This resulted in overrepresentation of many rural areas. In Alabama, for example, the state legislature had not reapportioned the districts since 1900. Some state constitutions even enshrined unequal representation, for example by providing one representative or senator per county, despite population differences. The U.S. Constitution specifically provides for this kind of “unequal representation” in the U.S. Senate; but in an era of increasing democratization, such unequal representation struck more Americans as unfair and undemocratic—and, at the state level, possibly a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

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Excerpt: Majority Opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren

Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections. . . . The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise. . . .

We indicated in Baker v. Carr. . . that the Equal Protection Clause provides discoverable and manageable standards for use by lower courts in determining the constitutionality of a state legislative apportionment scheme . . . .

[T]he judicial focus must be concentrated upon ascertaining whether there has been any discrimination against certain of the State’s citizens which constitutes an impermissible impairment of their constitutionally protected right to vote. . . . Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. . . .

Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system. . . .

It would appear extraordinary to suggest that a State could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain of the State’s voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote only once. . . .

Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State’s legislators. To conclude differently, and to sanction minority control of state legislative bodies, would appear to deny majority rights in a way that far surpasses any possible denial of minority rights that might otherwise be thought to result. Since legislatures are responsible for enacting laws by which all citizens are to be governed, they should be bodies which are collectively responsive to the popular will. And the concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged. . . . [W]e conclude that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators. . . .

The complexions of societies and civilizations change, often with amazing rapidity. A nation once primarily rural in character becomes predominantly urban. Representation schemes once fair and equitable become archaic and outdated. But the basic principle of representative government remains, and must remain, unchanged—the weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives. . . . The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races.

Excerpt: Concurrence, Justice Tom Clark

I . . . do not reach the question of the so-called ‘federal analogy.’ But in my view, if one house of the State Legislature meets the population standard, representation in the other house might include some departure from it so as to take into account, on a rational basis, other factors in order to afford some representation to the various elements of the State.

Excerpt: Dissent, Justice John M. Harlan II

Had the Court paused to probe more deeply into the matter, it would have found that the Equal Protection Clause was never intended to inhibit the States in choosing any democratic method they pleased for the apportionment of their legislatures. This is shown by the language of the Fourteenth Amendment taken as a whole, by the understanding of those who proposed and ratified it, and by the political practices of the States at the time the Amendment was adopted. It is confirmed by numerous state and congressional actions since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by the common understanding of the Amendment as evidenced by subsequent constitutional amendments and decisions of this Court . . . .

The failure of the Court to consider any of these matters cannot be excused or explained by any concept of ‘developing’ constitutionalism. It is meaningless to speak of constitutional ‘development’ when both the language and history of the controlling provisions of the Constitution are wholly ignored. Since it can, I think, be shown beyond doubt that state legislative apportionments, as such, are wholly free of constitutional limitations, save such as may be imposed by the Republican Form of Government Clause (Const., Art. IV, s 4), the Court’s action now bringing them within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment amounts to nothing less than an exercise of the amending power by this Court. . . .

[Justice Harlan goes on to discuss Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendment, all of which deal with the right to vote. If the Equal Protection Clause guarantees equality in the right to vote, why would those other constitutional amendments have been necessary?]

The facts recited above show beyond any possible doubt . . . that Congress, with full awareness of and attention to the possibility that the States would not afford full equality in voting rights to all their citizens, nevertheless deliberately chose not to interfere with the States’ plenary power in this regard when it proposed the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .

The Court declares it unconstitutional for a State to give effective consideration to any of the following in establishing legislative districts: (1) history; (2) ‘economic or other sorts of group interests’; (3) area; (4) geographical considerations; (5) a desire ‘to insure effective representation for sparsely settled areas’; (6) ‘availability of access of citizens to their representatives’; (7) theories of bicameralism (except those approved by the Court); (8) occupation; (9) ‘an attempt to balance urban and rural power.’ (10) the preference of a majority of voters in the State. . . .

I know of no principle of logic or practical or theoretical politics, still less any constitutional principle, which establishes all or any of these exclusions. Certain it is that the Court’s opinion does not establish them. So far as the Court says anything at all on this score, it says only that ‘legislators represent people, not trees or acres’; that ‘citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes’; that ‘people, not land or trees or pastures, vote.’ All this may be conceded. But it is surely equally obvious, and, in the context of elections, more meaningful to note that people are not ciphers and that legislators can represent their electors only by speaking for their interests—economic, social, political—many of which do reflect the place where the electors live. . . .

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