Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2020)

Summary

This case involved a potential conflict between the First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty and the reach of federal anti-discrimination law. After getting fired from a Catholic school, a California teacher sued the school for age discrimination. The employee taught both religious and secular subjects. The school argued that federal anti-discrimination laws did not apply to religious institutions’ decisions about who to hire as religious instructors. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that anti-discrimination laws do not apply to teachers who engage in religious instruction at religious schools. The “ministerial exception” to these laws prevents judges from interfering with employment decisions made by religious institutions.

Excerpt: Majority Opinion, Justice Samuel Alito

These cases require us to decide whether the First Amendment permits courts to intervene in employment disputes involving teachers at religious schools who are entrusted with the responsibility of instructing their students in the faith. The First Amendment protects the right of religious institutions “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” . . . Applying this principle, we held in [a previous decision] that the First Amendment barred a court from entertaining an employment discrimination claim brought by an elementary school teacher . . . against the religious school where she taught. Our decision built on a line of lower court cases adopting what was dubbed the “ministerial exception” to laws governing the employment relationship between a religious institution and certain key employees. We did not announce “a rigid formula” for determining whether an employee falls within this exception, but we identified circumstances that we found relevant in that case, including [the teacher’s] title as a “Minister of Religion, Commissioned,” her educational training, and her responsibility to teach religion and participate with students in religious activities. . . .

In the cases now before us, we consider employment discrimination claims brought by two elementary school teachers at Catholic schools whose teaching responsibilities are similar to [those of the teacher in the previous decision]. Although these teachers were not given the title of “minister” and have less religious training than [the teacher in the previous case], we hold that their cases fall within the same rule that dictated our [previous] decision . . . . The religious education and formation of students is the very reason for the existence of most private religious schools, and therefore the selection and supervision of the teachers upon whom the schools rely to do this work lie at the core of their mission. Judicial review of the way in which religious schools discharge those responsibilities would undermine the independence of religious institutions in a way that the First Amendment does not tolerate.

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Among other things, the Religion Clauses protect the right of churches and other religious institutions to decide matters “of faith and doctrine” without government intrusion. . . . State interference in that sphere would obviously violate the free exercise of religion, and any attempt by government to dictate or even to influence such matters would constitute one of the central attributes of an establishment of religion. The First Amendment outlaws such intrusion.

The independence of religious institutions in matters of “faith and doctrine” is closely linked to independence in what we have termed “matters of church government.” . . . This does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity from secular laws, but it does protect their autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s central mission. And a component of this autonomy is the selection of the individuals who play certain key roles.

The “ministerial exception” was based on this insight. Under this rule, courts are bound to stay out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions. The rule appears to have acquired the label “ministerial exception” because the individuals involved in pioneering cases were described as “ministers.” . . . But it is instructive to consider why a church’s independence on matters “of faith and doctrine” requires the authority to select, supervise, and if necessary, remove a minister without interference by secular authorities. Without that power, a wayward minister’s preaching, teaching, and counseling could contradict the church’s tenets and lead the congregation away from the faith. The ministerial exception was recognized to preserve a church’s independent authority in such matters. . . .

In [the previous decision], Cheryl Perich, a kindergarten and fourth grade teacher at an Evangelical Lutheran school, filed suit in federal court, claiming that she had been discharged because of a disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . . The school responded that the real reason for her dismissal was her violation of the Lutheran doctrine that disputes should be resolved internally and not by going to outside authorities. We held that her suit was barred by the “ministerial exception” and noted that it “concern[ed] government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church.” . . . We declined “to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister,” and we added that it was “enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.” . . . We identified four relevant circumstances but did not highlight any as essential.

First, we noted that her church had given Perich the title of “minister, with a role distinct from that of most of its members.” . . . Although she was not a minister in the usual sense of the term—she was not a pastor or deacon, did not lead a congregation, and did not regularly conduct religious services—she was classified as a “called” teacher, as opposed to a lay teacher, and after completing certain academic requirements, was given the formal title “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.” . . . 

Second, Perich’s position “reflected a significant degree of religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning.” . . .

Third, “Perich held herself out as a minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to religious service, according to its terms,” and by claiming certain tax benefits. . . .

Fourth, “Perich’s job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission.” . . . The church charged her with “lead[ing] others toward Christian maturity” and “teach[ing] faithfully the Word of God, the Sacred Scriptures, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.” . . . Although Perich also provided instruction in secular subjects, she taught religion four days a week, led her students in prayer three times a day, took her students to a chapel service once a week, and participated in the liturgy twice a year. “As a source of religious instruction,” we explained, “Perich performed an important role in transmitting the Lutheran faith to the next generation.” . . . 

But our recognition of the significance of [certain] factors in Perich’s case did not mean that they must be met—or even that they are necessarily important—in all other cases . . . .

What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does. And implicit in our [previous] decision . . . was a recognition that educating young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the very core of the mission of a private religious school. . . .

Religious education is vital to many faiths practiced in the United States. . . .

When we apply this understanding of the Religion Clauses to the cases now before us, it is apparent that Morrissey-Berru and Biel[,] [the two teachers involved in this case][,] qualify for the exemption we recognized in [our previous decision]. There is abundant record evidence that they both performed vital religious duties. Educating and forming students in the Catholic faith lay at the core of the mission of the schools where they taught, and their employment agreements and faculty handbooks specified in no uncertain terms that they were expected to help the schools carry out this mission and that their work would be evaluated to ensure that they were fulfilling that responsibility. As elementary school teachers responsible for providing instruction in all subjects, including religion, they were the members of the school staff who were entrusted most directly with the responsibility of educating their students in the faith. And not only were they obligated to provide instruction about the Catholic faith, but they were also expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in accordance with the faith. They prayed with their students, attended Mass with the students, and prepared the children for their participation in other religious activities. Their positions did not have all the attributes of Perich’s. Their titles did not include the term “minister,” and they had less formal religious training, but their core responsibilities as teachers of religion were essentially the same. And both their schools expressly saw them as playing a vital part in carrying out the mission of the church, and the schools’ definition and explanation of their roles is important. In a country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be expected to have a complete understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a particular role in every religious tradition. A religious institution’s explanation of the role of such employees in the life of the religion in question is important. . . .
 

Excerpt: Dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor

Two employers fired their employees allegedly because one had breast cancer and the other was elderly. Purporting to rely on [a previous decision], the majority shields those employers from disability and age-discrimination claims. In the Court’s view, because the employees taught short religion modules at Catholic elementary schools, they were “ministers” of the Catholic faith and thus could be fired for any reason, whether religious or nonreligious, benign or bigoted, without legal recourse. The Court reaches this result even though the teachers taught primarily secular subjects, lacked substantial religious titles and training, and were not even required to be Catholic. In foreclosing the teachers’ claims, the Court skews the facts, ignores the applicable standard of review, and collapses [our previous decision’s] careful analysis into a single consideration: whether a church thinks its employees play an important religious role. Because that simplistic approach has no basis in law and strips thousands of schoolteachers of their legal protections, I respectfully dissent. . . .

Our pluralistic society requires religious entities to abide by generally applicable laws. . . . Consistent with the First Amendment (and over sincerely held religious objections), the Government may compel religious institutions to pay Social Security taxes for their employees,  . . . deny nonprofit status to entities that discriminate because of race, . . . require applicants for certain public benefits to register with Social Security numbers, . . . enforce child-labor protections, . . . and impose minimum-wage laws . . . .

Congress, however, has crafted exceptions to protect religious autonomy. Some antidiscrimination laws, like the Americans with Disabilities Act, permit a religious institution to consider religion when making employment decisions. . . . Title VII further permits a school to prefer “hir[ing] and employ[ing]” people “of a particular religion” if its curriculum “propagat[es]” that religion. . . . These statutory exceptions protect a religious entity’s ability to make employment decisions—hiring or firing—for religious reasons.

The “ministerial exception,” by contrast, is a judge-made doctrine. This Court first recognized it eight years ago . . . , concluding that the First Amendment categorically bars certain antidiscrimination suits by religious leaders against their religious employers. . . . When it applies, the exception is extraordinarily potent: It gives an employer free rein to discriminate because of race, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, or other traits protected by law when selecting or firing their “ministers,” even when the discrimination is wholly unrelated to the employer’s religious beliefs or practices. . . . That is, an employer need not cite or possess a religious reason at all; the ministerial exception even condones animus. . . . 

[A] religious entity’s ability to choose its faith leaders—rabbis, priests, nuns, imams, ministers, to name a few—should be free from government interference, but . . . generally applicable laws still protect[] most employees. . . .

[Our previous decision’s] well-rounded approach ensured that a church could not categorically disregard generally applicable antidiscrimination laws for nonreligious reasons. By analyzing objective and easily discernable markers like titles, training, and public-facing conduct, [it] charted a way to separate leaders who “personify” a church’s “beliefs” or who “minister to the faithful” from individuals who may simply relay religious tenets. . . . This balanced First Amendment concerns of state-church entanglement while avoiding an overbroad carve-out from employment protections. . . .

Faithfully applying [our earlier decision’s] approach and common sense confirms that the teachers here are not Catholic “ministers” as a matter of law. . . . 

[The lower court] correctly concluded that neither school had shown that the ministerial exception barred the teachers’ claims for disability and age discrimination. . . . 

First, . . . neither school publicly represented that either teacher was a Catholic spiritual leader or “minister.” Neither conferred a title reflecting such a position. Rather, the schools referred to both Biel and Morrissey-Berru as “lay” teachers, which the circuit courts have long recognized as a mark of nonministerial, as opposed to “ministerial,” status. . . . 

Second (and further undermining the schools’ claims), neither teacher had a “significant degree of religious training” or underwent a “formal process of commissioning.” . . . Nor did either school require such training or commissioning as a prerequisite to gaining (or keeping) employment. In Biel’s case, the record reflects that she attended a single conference that lasted “four or five hours,” briefly discussed “how to incorporate God into . . . lesson plans,” and otherwise “showed [teachers] how to do art and make little pictures or things like that.” . . . Notably, all elementary school faculty attended the conference, including the computer teacher. . . . In turn, Our Lady of Guadalupe did not ask Morrissey-Berru to undergo any religious training for her first 13 years of teaching, until it asked her to attend [an] uncompleted program . . . . This consideration instructs that the teachers here did not fall within the ministerial exception.

Third, neither Biel nor Morrissey-Berru held herself out as having a leadership role in the faith community. Neither claimed any benefits (tax, governmental, ceremonial, or administrative) available only to spiritual leaders. . . . Nor does it matter that all teachers signed contracts agreeing to model and impart Catholic values. This component of the [ministerial exception] inquiry focuses on outward-facing behavior, and neither Biel nor Morrissey-Berru publicly represented herself as anything more than a fifth-grade teacher. . . . The Court does not grapple with this third component of [our established ministerial exception] inquiry, which seriously undermines the schools’ cases.

That leaves only the fourth consideration . . . : the teachers’ function. To be sure, Biel and Morrissey-Berru taught religion for a part of some days in the week. But that should not transform them automatically into ministers who “guide” the faith “on its way.” . . . Although the Court does not resolve this functional question with “a stopwatch,” it still considers the “amount of time an employee spends on particular activities” in “assessing that employee’s status.” . . .  Here, the time Biel and Morrissey-Berru spent on secular instruction far surpassed their time teaching religion. For the vast majority of class, they taught subjects like reading, writing, spelling, grammar, vocabulary, math, science, social studies, and geography. In so doing, both were like any public school teacher in California, subject to the same statewide curriculum guidelines. . . . In other words, both Biel and Morrissey-Berru had almost exclusively secular duties, making it especially improper to deprive them of all legal protection when their employers have not offered any religious reason for the alleged discrimination.

Nor is it dispositive that both teachers prayed with their students. Biel did not lead devotionals in her classroom, did not teach prayers, and had a minor role in monitoring student behavior during a once-a-month mass. . . . Morrissey-Berru did lead classroom prayers, bring her students to a cathedral once a year, direct the school Easter play, and sign a contract directing her to “assist with Liturgy Planning.” . . . But these occasional tasks should not trigger as a matter of law the ministerial exception. Morrissey-Berru did not lead mass, deliver sermons, or select hymns. . . . And unlike the teacher in [our previous decision], there is no evidence that Morrissey-Berru led devotional exercises. . . . Her limited religious role does not fit [the earlier decision’s] description of a “minister to the faithful.” . . . 

Nevertheless, the Court insists that the teachers are ministers because “implicit in our [previous] decision . . . was a recognition that educating young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the very core of the mission of a private religious school.” . . . But teaching religion in school alone cannot dictate ministerial status. If it did, then [our previous decision] wasted precious pages discussing titles, training, and other objective indicia to examine whether Cheryl Perich was a minister. . . . 

Were there any doubt left about the proper result here, recall that neither school has shown that it required its religion teachers to be Catholic. The Court does not explain how the schools here can show, or have shown, that a non-Catholic “personif[ies]” Catholicism or leads the faith. . . . Instead, the Court remarks that a “rigid” coreligionist requirement might “not always be easy” to apply to faiths like Judaism or variations of Protestantism. . . . Perhaps. But that has nothing to do with Catholicism.

Pause, for a moment, on the Court’s conclusion: Even if the teachers were not Catholic, and even if they were forbidden to participate in the church’s sacramental worship, they would nonetheless be “ministers” of the Catholic faith simply because of their supervisory role over students in a religious school. That stretches the law and logic past their breaking points. (Indeed, it is ironic that Our Lady of Guadalupe School seeks complete immunity for age discrimination when its teacher handbook promised not to discriminate on that basis.) As the Government once put it, even when a school has a “pervasively religious atmosphere,” its faculty are unlikely ministers when “there is no requirement that its teachers even be members of [its] religious denomination.” . . . It is hard to imagine a more concrete example than these cases. . . .

The Court’s conclusion portends grave consequences. As the Government (arguing for Biel at the time) explained to the [lower court], “thousands of Catholic teachers” may lose employment-law protections because of today’s outcome. . . . Other sources tally over a hundred thousand secular teachers whose rights are at risk. . . . And that says nothing of the rights of countless coaches, camp counselors, nurses, social-service workers, in-house lawyers, media-relations personnel, and many others who work for religious institutions. All these employees could be subject to discrimination for reasons completely irrelevant to their employers’ religious tenets.

In expanding the ministerial exception far beyond its historic narrowness, the Court overrides Congress’ carefully tailored exceptions for religious employers. Little if nothing appears left of the statutory exemptions after today’s constitutional broadside. So long as the employer determines that an employee’s “duties” are “vital” to “carrying out the mission of the church,” . . . then today’s laissez-faire analysis appears to allow that employer to make employment decisions because of a person’s skin color, age, disability, sex, or any other protected trait for reasons having nothing to do with religion.

This sweeping result is profoundly unfair. The Court is not only wrong on the facts, but its error also risks upending antidiscrimination protections for many employees of religious entities. Recently, this Court has lamented a perceived “discrimination against religion.” . . . Yet here it swings the pendulum in the extreme opposite direction, permitting religious entities to discriminate widely and with impunity for reasons wholly divorced from religious beliefs. The inherent injustice in the Court’s conclusion will be impossible to ignore for long, particularly in a pluralistic society like ours. One must hope that a decision deft enough to remold [our previous decision] to fit the result reached today reflects the Court’s capacity to cabin the consequences tomorrow.
 

Read the Full Opinion