Article II, Section 3 grants and constrains presidential power. This Section invests the President with the discretion to convene Congress on “extraordinary occasions,” a power that has been used to summon the chambers to consider nominations, war declarations, and emergency legislation. The Section also grants the President the authority to adjourn Congress whenever the chambers cannot agree when to adjourn, a power that no President has ever exercised.
Section 3 mostly imposes obligations on the President that are varied and significant. The President must provide information on the “state of the union” from “time to time.” This seems to oblige the President to share information with Congress. The President shall “recommend” measures to Congress, a soft duty that necessarily cedes discretion. The President “shall receive” all foreign ambassadors, a duty that many suppose grants the accompanying power to recognize foreign nations and their governments. The President “shall Commission all the officers of the United States,” a Clause that forces the President to authenticate the status of federal officials.
Finally, and most significantly, Section 3 contains the Faithful Execution Clause, commonly known as the Take Care Clause. Some suppose that the Clause is a major source of power because it seemingly invests the office with broad enforcement authority. Yet, at the same time, the provision also serves as a major limitation on that power because it underscores that the executive is under a duty to faithfully execute the laws of Congress and not disregard them.
The Take Care Clause has played a central role in momentous constitutional disputes. Legislators have discussed it in many debates regarding the scope of presidential power, including whether the President has a constitutional power to remove federal officers. Three Presidents, Andrew Johnson, William Clinton, and Donald Trump were impeached by the House, in part, for allegedly violating their Take Care Clause duties. Famous Supreme Court cases, like Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (1952) and Myers v. United States (1926), relied upon particular claims about the Clause. More recently the Clause played a central role in the debates and litigation surrounding President Barack Obama’s enforcement of federal immigration laws and also in Donald Trump’s decision to suspend the congressional ban on Tik-Tok. Presidents are increasingly refusing to enforce statutes, often on policy grounds.
The Clause traces back to the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution and the 1777 New York Constitution. Both granted their executives “executive power” and also required them to execute the laws faithfully. Early constitutional discussions shed some light on its meaning. Though the Clause is found amidst a sea of duties in Article II, Section 3, some, including Alexander Hamilton, spoke of the “power” of “faithfully executing the laws.” While President, George Washington observed, “it is my duty to see the Laws executed: to permit them to be trampled upon with impunity would be repugnant to” that duty.
At a minimum, the Clause means that the President may neither breach federal law nor order his or her subordinates to do so, for defiance cannot be considered faithful execution. The Constitution also incorporates the English bars on dispensing or suspending the law, with some supposing that the Clause itself prohibits both. Hence the Constitution itself never grants the President authority to either authorize private violations of the law (by issuing individualized dispensations) or nullify laws (by generally suspending their operation).
Beyond these constraints, the Clause raises several vexing questions. For instance, must the President enforce those laws she believes are unconstitutional? Some scholars argue that Presidents must enforce all congressional laws, without regard to his or her own constitutional opinions. Yet modern Presidents occasionally exercise a power to ignore such enactments on the grounds they are not true “laws” subject to the faithful execution duty. In so doing, they somewhat mimic the arguments and practice of President Thomas Jefferson, who refused to enforce the Sedition Act on the grounds that it was unconstitutional.
There is also the related question of whether the President must honor statutes that purport to limit his authority over law execution. Can Congress decree by statute that the President must eschew supervision or oversight over the enforcement of certain laws? Some suppose that the Congress can insulate execution from presidential control, while others insist that the Congress cannot strip away the President’s duty.
Another issue that arises is as a practical matter, the sweep of contemporary federal law ensures that federal law enforcers have tremendous enforcement discretion. Resource constraints coupled with numerous violations often preclude a policy of total enforcement. Given the inevitable tradeoffs, modern Presidents weigh the costs and benefits of investigation, apprehension, and prosecution, and sometimes create rules for allocating scarce resources across the range of possible investigations and prosecutions. In this context, judging what counts as faithful execution is laden with value judgments about the relative merits of certain enforcement priorities over others. Moreover, contentious disputes about the scope of discretion invariably revolve around claims that the President has violated his or her duty of faithful execution by failing to adopt a particular enforcement policy or strategy.
Finally, there remains the matter of how any limits on presidential power, whether contained in Article II, Section 3 or elsewhere, can be enforced. Article II does not directly address the point. Nonetheless, the executive has long acted as though it has a duty to implement judicial decisions, even those the President rejects. But what if that were to change? What if the President refuses to comply with a court decision limiting executive power because he or she believes that decision is wrong, or worse yet, because he or she simply decides not to abide by a judicial decision because it is inconvenient? Thus far, the Nation has not been forced to directly face executive defiance of a court order but there is no guarantee that we will have that luxury going forward.