The Constitution provides, in the second paragraph of Article II, Section 2, that “the President shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” Thus, treaty making is a power shared between the President and the Senate. In general, the weight of practice has been to confine the Senate’s authority to that of disapproval or approval, with approval including the power to attach conditions or reservations to the treaty.
For instance, the authority to negotiate treaties has been assigned to the President alone as part of a general authority to control diplomatic communications. Thus, since the early Republic, the Clause has not been interpreted to give the Senate a constitutionally mandated role in advising the President before the conclusion of the treaty.
Also of substantial vintage is the practice by which the Senate puts reservations on treaties, in which it modifies or excludes the legal effect of the treaty. The President then has the choice, as with all treaties to which the Senate has assented, to ratify the treaty or not, as he sees fit.
The question of whether the President may terminate treaties without Senate consent is more contested. In 1978, President Carter gave notice to Taiwan of the termination of our mutual defense treaty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the President did have authority to terminate the treaty, but the Supreme Court in Goldwater v. Carter (1979), vacated the judgment without reaching the merits. The treaty termination in Goldwater accorded with the terms of the treaty itself. A presidential decision to terminate a treaty in violation of its terms would raise additional questions under the Supremacy Clause, which makes treaties, along with statutes and the Constitution itself, the “supreme Law of the Land.”
There remains the question of how the Treaty Clause comports with the rest of the system of enumerated and separated powers. Missouri v. Holland (1920) suggests that the Treaty Clause permits treaties to be made on subjects that would go beyond the powers otherwise enumerated for the federal government in the Constitution. In Reid v. Covert (1957), however, the Court held that treaties may not violate the individual rights provisions of the Constitution. And in Bond v. United States (2014) the Court read the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act narrowly, observing that a treaty’s implementing statute cannot, without a clear statement, intrude upon ‘the delicate balance of federalism’ and convert the national government’s limited powers into a general police power.”
Whether the Treaty Clause is exclusive—or merely first among several tools—for striking significant international bargains remains contested. In fact, the majority of U.S. pacts with other nations are not formal “treaties,” but are sometimes adopted pursuant to statutory authority and sometimes by the President acting unilaterally. The Supreme Court has endorsed unilateral executive agreements by the President in some limited circumstances. For instance, in United States v. Belmont (1937), the Court upheld an agreement to settle property claims of the government and U.S. citizens in the context of diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. In Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981), the Court upheld President Carter’s agreement with Iran, again concerning property claims of citizens, in the context of releasing U.S. diplomats held hostage by Iran. The Court has never made clear the exact scope of permissible unilateral agreements, but they appear to include at least one-shot claim settlements and agreements attendant to diplomatic recognition though no case suggests a sole‑executive agreement can supersede an Act of Congress.
With so-called congressional-executive agreements, Congress has also on occasion enacted legislation that authorizes agreements with other nations. For instance, trade agreements, like the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have often been enacted by statute. In contrast, the Senate balked when President Carter floated the idea of approving SALT II by ordinary statute instead of by the Constitution’s two‑thirds treaty route for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II) treaty. It is sometimes argued in favor of the substantial interchangeability of treaties with so-called congressional-executive agreements that Congress enjoys enumerated powers that touch on foreign affairs, like the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. But, unlike legislation, international agreements establish binding agreements with foreign nations, potentially setting up entanglements that mere legislation does not.
Since Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Foster & Elam v. Neilson (1829), the Supreme Court has distinguished between treaties that are now called self-executing and treaties that are non-self-executing. Self-executing treaties have domestic force in U.S. courts without further legislation. Non-self-executing treaties require additional legislation before the treaty has such domestic force. In Medellín v. Texas (2008), the Court suggested there may be a presumption against finding treaties self-executing unless the treaty text in which the Senate concurred clearly indicated its self-executing status.
- Appointments
The remainder of Section 2 of Article II deals with the subject of official appointments. With regard to diplomatic officials, judges and other officers of the United States, Article II lays out four modes of appointment. The default option pairs presidential nomination with Senate confirmation. With regard to “inferior officers,” Congress may, within its discretion, vest their appointment “in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.” The Court has yet to mark a clear boundary between methods of appointment: inferior officers may be chosen inside the executive hierarchy or, where no ‘incongruity’ arises, by the judiciary. Morrison v. Olson (1988).
Buckley v. Valeo (1976) confirms that the Article II variations are Congress’s sole options in providing for the appointment of officers of the United States. The text, however, raises the questions: Who counts as an “officer” of the United States, as opposed to a mere employee? And what characterizes an officer’s status as “inferior,” as opposed to “superior” or “principal?”
The Court’s definition of “officer” in Buckley entails a degree of circularity. In general, “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” is an “officer of the United States.” By contrast, a federal employee is not an “officer” if performing “duties only in aid of those functions that Congress may carry out by itself, or in an area sufficiently removed from the administration and enforcement of the public law as to permit their being performed by persons not ‘Officers of the United States.’” A later case, INS v. Chadha (1983), may implicitly have given the Buckley formulation more substance. Chadha held that the enactment of legislation is Congress’s only permissible means of taking action that has the “purposes and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative branch.” Importing Chadha’s holding into the Buckley holding implies that, at a minimum, any administrator Congress vests with authority to alter the legal rights, duties and relations of persons outside the legislative branch would have to be an “officer,” and not an employee, of the United States because that officer would be performing a function forbidden to Congress acting alone.
Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), applied the Buckley formulation to hold that special trial judges of the U.S. Tax Court were “officers of the United States.” The Court’s treatment of the issue cited a number of characteristics without indicating the weight that might attach to each. The Court observed: “The office of special trial judge is ‘established by Law,’ Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and the duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office are specified by statute. These characteristics distinguish special trial judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III courts on a temporary, episodic basis, whose positions are not established by law, and whose duties and functions are not delineated in a statute. Furthermore, special trial judges perform more than ministerial tasks.”
Distinguishing inferior from principal officers has also sometimes proved puzzling. Morrison v. Olson, which upheld the judicial appointment of independent counsel under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, applied a balancing test focused on the breadth of the officer’s mandate, length of tenure, and limited independent policymaking. A later decision, however, provided an additional or perhaps substitute bright-line test, defining “inferior officers” as “officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Edmond v. United States (1997).
Later cases have appeared to clarify that it would be inconsistent with “inferior officer” status that an officer be empowered to make significant binding decisions on behalf of the executive branch. Thus, for example, in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1 (2021), the Court found that Administrative Patent Judges serving in the Commerce Department’s Patent and Trademark Office were not “inferior” because, in certain cases, they could make effectively final decisions concerning whether existing patents satisfy the novelty and nonobviousness requirements for inventions. Because their mode of appointment—appointment by the Secretary of Commerce—would be valid only if APJ’s are “inferior,” the Court read into the relevant statute authority for the Director of the PTO to review and, as appropriate, set aside decisions of the APJ’s, thus confirming their subordinate rank. The Court underscored the point in Lucia v. SEC (2018), holding that administrative law judges who enter final adjudicatory orders wield ‘significant authority’ and therefore must be appointed—or at least directly controlled—by a presidentially accountable officer; where meaningful supervision is absent, such officials cross the constitutional line from inferior to principal status. The Court likewise found members of the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force within Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to be inferior because the Court determined them to be removable at will and subject to review and overruling by the Secretary of HHS. Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc., 606 U.S. ___ (2025).
The Recess Appointments Clause reflects an era when Congress rode home for months, so the President could keep offices filled during the long recess. Over the ensuing decades—and extending to modern times when Congress itself sits nearly year-round—the somewhat awkward wording of the Clause seemed to pose two issues that the Supreme Court decided for the first time in 2014. First, does the power of recess appointments extend to vacancies that initially occurred while the Senate was not in recess? Second, may a period of Senate adjournment trigger the President’s recess appointment power even if that period of adjournment occurs during a Senate session, rather than between the adjournment of one session sine die and the convening of the next? Finding the text ambiguous, the Court answered both questions affirmatively, provided that the relevant “intra-session” recess lasted ten days or longer. (As a result, in the particular case, the Court ruled against the President, because the relevant recess was too short.) The majority rested its analysis on what it took to be a relatively consistent pattern of behavior by Congress and the executive branch, effectively ratifying the President’s power as thus construed. But by holding that even pro‑forma sessions interrupt a ‘recess,’ Noel Canning may render the Clause largely vestigial in our age of near‑continuous Senate sittings: only the rare adjournment of ten days or more now opens the constitutional window for a recess appointment. NLRB v. Noel Canning (2014).
Perhaps the greatest source of controversy regarding the Appointments Clause, however, surrounds its implications, if any, for the removal of federal officers. The Supreme Court has held that Congress may not condition the removal of a federal official on Senate “advice and consent,” Myers v. United States (1926), and, indeed, may not reserve for itself any direct role in the removal of officers other than through impeachment, Bowsher v. Synar (1986).
Those cases do not determine, however, whether Congress may limit the President’s own removal power, for example, by conditioning an officer’s removal on some level of “good cause.” The Supreme Court first gave an affirmative answer to that question in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935), which upheld a statutory limitation on the President’s discretion in discharging members of the Federal Trade Commission to cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Morrison v. Olson reaffirmed the permissibility of creating federal administrators protected from at-will presidential discharge, so long any restrictions on removal do “not impermissibly interfere with the President’s exercise of his constitutionally appointed functions.” Although this formulation falls short of a bright-line test for identifying those officers for whom presidents must have at-will removal authority, the doctrine at least implies that presidents must have some degree of removal power for all officers. That is, presidents must be able at least to secure an officer’s discharge for good cause, lest the President not be able to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The Roberts Court, however, has taken significant steps toward expanding the President’s right to remove executive officers at will. In 2010, the Court held that officers of the United States may not be shielded from presidential removal by multiple layers of restrictions on removal. Thus, inferior officers appointed by heads of departments who are not themselves removable at will by the President must be removable at will by the officers who appoint them. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board (2010).
A decade later, the Court characterized Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison v. Olson as two exceptions from what it inferred from Myers v. United States as the proper understanding of Article II, namely, that presidents are constitutionally entitled to remove without cause officers who exercise executive power on the president’s behalf. In Seila Law v. Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (2020), the Court applied that understanding to set aside statutory tenure protection for the head of any agency governed by a single director, such as the CFPB. The following term, the Court likewise invalidated statutory tenure protection for the administrator of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, notwithstanding that the regulatory reach of the FHFA was far narrower than that of the CFPB.
In Seila Law, the Court limited Morrison v. Olson to the approval of “for cause” tenure protection “for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.” It read Humphrey’s Executor as providing an exception from removal at will only for multimember bodies of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that perform quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions. It is currently uncertain whether the Court will allow that exception to remain or will instead overrule Humphrey’s Executor. Under President Donald Trump, the Justice Department has argued that an exemption for multimember agencies cannot survive the logic of Seila Law, and the President determined to test that proposition by firing a number of independent officers notwithstanding statutes purporting to protect them from at-will removal.
Two such officials whom the President fired succeeded temporarily in securing reinstatement based on lower court decisions continuing to follow Humphrey’s Executor. Nonetheless, in a 6-3 per curiam decision, Trump v. Wilcox (2025), the Supreme Court granted the Administration a stay of the reinstatement order while the dispute continues to work its way up to the Supreme Court on the merits. The majority opinion purports not to decide whether the multimember agencies at issue (and thus their principal officers) fall within the Humphrey’s Executor exception to what the Court how holds is an implicit Article II grant of at-will removal power to the President. Yet the Court predicted government success on the question whether those agencies exercise “considerable executive power,” which seems to suggest a predisposition to uphold the contested discharges. If the Court were to sustain the firings at issue, it would likely proceed either to read Humphrey’s Executor to apply only to agencies with no significant executive authority or overrule it altogether.
On the other hand, the Court appeared to recognize anxiety in financial markets that overruling Humphrey’s Executor or narrowing it to its facts would put at risk the independence of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors or other members of the Federal Open Market Committee. The Court tried, however, to allay such anxiety, stating: “The Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi- private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.” Whether the majority persists in that view following what is sure to be full briefing and oral argument remains to be seen.