Earlier this week, the Supreme Court added three cases to its docket for the Court’s next term. Two of the newly granted cases take on issues surrounding the death penalty, while the other case involves state legislature redistricting.
In the case of Moore v. Texas, the Supreme Court will face the question of whether it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to use outdated medical standards in assessing intellectual disabilities to determine whether an individual may be executed.
The Court set a precedent in the case of Atkins v. Virginia in 2002. In that case, the Court held that executions of the intellectually disabled are cruel and unusual punishments prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. That decision, however, left it up to the states to decide how to determine if a criminal was intellectually disabled. The Court only gave general guidance on the issue.
In 2014, the Court attempted to solve one aspect of the irregular application of approaches amongst the states in Hall v. Florida. In that decision, the Court held that Florida’s policy of relying only on an I.Q. score cutoff was too narrow because it created an unacceptable risk that a person with intellectual disabilities would be executed. Instead, the Court said that states need to rely on modern diagnostic tests and standards to determine a person’s intellectual disability.
In Moore, the Court has agreed to hear the appeal of Bobby James Moore of Houston, Texas. In 1980, Moore was convicted of the shooting death of a grocery store clerk and was put on death row. Following the Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins, a court found that Moore was intellectually disabled and was therefore ineligible for execution. The appeals court reversed, stating that the lower court erred by using the incorrect standard.
The standard that the Texas appeals court referred to as the correct standard is based on a 1992 definition of intellectual disability. The professional medical community now considers that 1992 standard to be out of date, as it does not focus enough on clinical evaluations of the individual. The appeals court determined that the courts were required to rely upon the outdated standard until the state legislature changed the definition.
The Supreme Court specifically chose not to hear the other issue in the case: whether a prolonged stay on death row is constitutional, particularly on the theory that such treatment causes the individual severe psychological harm. In fact, the Court initially issued an order on Monday that said that it would hear this issue as well, but several house later clarified that they would only hear the intellectual disability issue.
The Court will be facing another Texas capital punishment case in Buck v. Stephens. In that case, the Court is being asked to set aside the death sentence of Duane Buck because of the influence of racist trial testimony that said that black defendants were more dangerous than others.
Buck was given convicted of the 1995 murder of his former girlfriend and one of her friends. Under Texas law, a death sentence is only allowed if it is shown that the defendant poses a threat of future danger to society.
During the sentencing phase of the trial, Dr. Walter Quijano was called by Buck’s trial attorney to testify to the issue of dangerousness as a psychologist and expert witness. Buck is African-American, and in his testimony, Dr. Quijano stated that his studies had shown that black males were more likely to be a danger to the public. He testified that Buck would therefore likely be dangerous in the future because of his race.
In seeking Supreme Court review, Buck argues that his trial lawyers were ineffective and that his death sentence was influenced by racial bias from Dr. Quijano’s testimony. Texas prosecutors argue that Buck’s current appeal is barred on procedural grounds. Buck’s case was previously turned down by the Court in 2011 when it was based on claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
The Court also accepted a case reviewing racial gerrymandering in Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections. The case focuses on Virginia, where, following a federal census, the legislature redrew the districts for its lower chamber. This case focuses on the twelve districts that were given a majority population of minorities.
The challengers argue that the creation of these districts was the result of racial gerrymandering in an effort to secure Republican power, and that the use of race in this case is unconstitutional. The Republican lawmakers said that this was done to protect the seats of minority legislators and to comply with the Voting Rights Act.
In prior rulings, the Court has determined that it is unconstitutional to draw districting maps using race as the “predominant factor” in deciding who should be included in the district. The panel of federal judges who heard this case previously voted 2-1 to uphold eleven of the twelve districts. And even in the single district where they did find that race was a predominant factor, the judges held that it was not unconstitutional because it had been done to avoid a violation of federal civil rights law.
Last year, in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, the Court issued a 5-4 ruling that rejected the use of “mechanical racial targets” in a gerrymandering.
Joshua Waimberg is a legal fellow at the National Constitution Center.
